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Abstract 
When components overlap, the aircraft multiple-hit vulnerability analysis usually consists of two steps. The first is to deter-
mine the aircraft unique existent states using vulnerable area decomposition method, and the second is to calculate the aircraft 
cumulated probability of kill using Markov chain method for exact solution or Monte Carlo method for solving the combinatorial 
explosion problem. This article proposes a direct simulation method for calculating the aircraft multiple-hit vulnerability in order 
to avoid the complex vulnerable area decomposition issue. In this method, random method is adopted to produce the multiple-hit 
locations and Bernoulli trial is used to determine the kill or no kill of each component hit by one shot line, and kill tree is 
checked to determine aircraft existent states during one simulation. When the number of times of simulation is large enough, the 
aircraft multiple-hit vulnerability can be statistically obtained. Analysis shows that the proposed direct simulation method can 
provide good accuracy compared with Markov chain method and avoid the combinatorial explosion problem, and does not need 
the complex vulnerable area decomposition and can directly calculate the aircraft multiple-hit vulnerability. Another important 
finding is the binomial or Poisson simplified approach is sometimes very poor in accuracy, and should be used cautiously. 
Keywords: vulnerability; overlap; multiple-hit; simulation; combinatorial explosion 
1. Introduction1 
One of the important parts in aircraft vulnerability 
assessment is to calculate the cumulated kill probabil-
ity of aircraft subjected to the multiple-hit by nonex-
plosive penetrators (multiple-hit vulnerability)[1]. At 
present, there are seven methods for calculating air-
craft multiple-hit vulnerability: binomial, Poisson, 
“Monte Carlo with model of filling boxes with balls”, 
Markov chain, tree diagram, simplified binomial and 
simplified Poisson. The binomial and Poisson methods 
are based on the assumption that under a given hit the 
aircraft kill probability pK/H is constant, so these 
methods cannot be applied to an aircraft with redun-
dant components. The latter five methods do not have 
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the restriction of constant pK/H. The focus of this article 
is to discuss the multiple-hit vulnerability of redundant 
or nonredundant aircraft with overlapping components. 
Simplified approaches (binomial or Poisson) are ob-
tained by assuming that all components kills are inde-
pendent and sometimes their accuracies are very poor 
according to the examples provided in this article. 
They are usually used to assess the missile effective-
ness roughly and quickly[1-5]. Markov chain and tree 
diagram methods are the exact solving methods and 
highly recommended by some scholars for their high 
accuracies[1,6-14]. However, the combinatorial explosion 
will happen when the total number of redundant com-
ponents reaches a certain amount, since the dimensions 
of Markov transition matrix or the number of existent 
states of aircraft and the number of tree branches in-
crease exponentially with the increase of the number 
of redundant components. To avoid the combinatorial 
explosion problem, Ref.[6] presents “Monte Carlo 
with model of filling boxes with balls” method, which 
yields an approximate solution that improves as the 
number of iterations increases. It should be noted that, 
when aircraft has overlapping components, the vul-
nerable area decomposition method[7] should be used Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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to determine the aircraft unique existent states[7-9] be-
fore calculating the multiple-hit vulnerability using 
Markov chain, tree diagram or “Monte Carlo with 
model of filling boxes with balls” method. Hence, 
these three methods are regarded as two-step methods 
in this article. In order to avoid the vulnerable area 
decomposition, we propose a one-step direct simula-
tion method for directly calculating the multiple-hit 
vulnerability of aircraft with overlapping components. 
2. Direct Simulation Method for Multiple-hit Vul-
nerability Calculation 
The flowchart of the proposed method is shown in 
Fig.1 and more details about this flowchart are pre-
sented as follows. 
Aircraft/component vulnerability modeling
Laying a planar grid and generating R shot lines
Determining the shotlines that hit aircraft and 
adding the corresponding shot points to array 
B. The size of array B is M.
Inputting the hit number of times of threats N, 
z = 0
Randomly generating z shot locations among M
shot points, and adding them to array A
Determining the kill or no kill state of each 
component
Will all the locations within array A 
lead to the kill of aircraft?
Prn = Prn + 1
Delete all 
the 
elements 
in array A
Yes
P = N0?
Pr[z] § Prn/N0
z = N ?
Output
z = z + 1
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Inputting the number of times for Monte Carlo 
simulation N0, P = 1, Prn = 0 
P = P +1
Notes:     z — Hit number counter;  P — Monte Carlo simulation co-
unter; Prn — Number of aircraft being  killed after N0 times 
of simulations; Pr[z] — Aircraft cumulated probability of kill  
after z hits
 
Fig.1  Direct simulation method for calculating aircraft 
cumulated probability of kill. 
2.1. Aircraft/component vulnerability modeling 
The original geometric models of the outer skin or a 
component of aircraft is approximated by flat quadri-
lateral patches. The information of the geometric 
model for aircraft outer skin includes the node num-
bering of each finite quadrilateral patch, node coordi-
nates, patch thickness, patch material, etc. The infor-
mation contained in the component model includes 
node numbering of each finite quadrilateral patch, 
node coordinates, element material and thickness, the 
probability of kill under a given hit on component pk/h 
function, component redundancy or nonredundancy 
relationship which can be expressed as the minimal cut 
sets, etc. 
2.2. Shot lines generating 
Let xmax be the maximal x coordinate, ymax be the 
maximal y coordinate, xmin be the minimal x coordinate 
and ymin be the minimal y coordinate of the projection 
of aircraft/components. A rectangle is obtained by the 
intersection of four lines of x = xmax, x = xmin, y = ymax 
and y = ymin. The grid cells (length w and height h) on 
the rectangle are superimposed over the quadrilateral 
finite element model of aircraft/components and a shot 
line is generated in the center of each grid cell. The 
total number of shot lines is R, as shown in Fig.2. 
 
Fig.2  Shot line generation. 
In Fig. 2, the circle dots denote the region in which 
the shot lines do not hit the aircraft. The diamond dots 
denote the region in which the shot lines hit the aircraft. 
The total number of the diamond dots is M and the 
total number of the circle dots is R í M. The direct 
simulation method is constructed based on the ran-
domly sampled diamond dots. The procedure for cal-
culating the aircraft cumulated probability of kill after 
z hits is as follows. 
(1) Constructing the randomly sampled space which 
is the set of diamond dots shown in Fig.2. 
(2) Randomly sampling z hit locations from the 
sampled space, determining the kill or no kill state of 
each component, and determining the aircraft kill or no 
kill state by checking the kill tree.  
(3) Repeating Step (2) many times. When the num-
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ber of times of simulation is large enough, the vulner-
ability can be statistically obtained.  
The main difference between the proposed one-step 
direct simulation method and the two-step Monte 
Carlo method of Ref.[3] is that, for the former method 
the multiple-hit vulnerability is statistically obtained 
by sampling the hit points within the projected area 
rather than the vulnerable area, and thus constructing 
the “model of filling boxes with balls”[6] with vulner-
able area decomposition method is avoided. 
2.3. Criterion for kill of component 
Fig.3 represents a shot line intersecting the aircraft 
and its components. A given shot line has successively 
penetrated three critical components. The shot line 
with the initial entrance velocity vr and mass mr pene-
trates the outer skin of aircraft, and then with the re-
sidual velocity v0 and mass m0 penetrates components 
1-3 successively. Finally, it exits the skin of aircraft 
with the residual velocity ve and mass me. In Fig.3, vi 
and mi (i=1, 2, 3) represent the shot line residual ve-
locity and mass after penetrating component i. 
 
Fig.3  Intersection of shot line with aircraft. 
It is assumed that these components are represented 
as having only two states: either kill or no kill. We use 
1 (true) to represent kill state and 0 (false) to represent 
no kill state. Given that the probability of killing com-
ponent i is pk/h,i, one performs a Bernoulli trial on each 
component by drawing a uniformly distributed random 
number ri between 0 and 1, then the state ki of compo-
nent can be expressed as   
   
 
 
k/h,
k/h,
1 Kill
0 No kill
i i
i
i i
r p
k
r p
­° ® t°¯     (1) 
When considering overlapping components, the 
main difference between the proposed method and the 
traditional methods is as follows. No matter overlap-
ping exits or not, the proposed method determines the 
component existent state by Bernoulli trial. However, 
in Markov chain, tree diagram or “Monte Carlo with 
model of filling boxes with balls” method, when com-
ponent overlapping happens, the component existent 
states must be analyzed by vulnerable area decomposi-
tion method. 
2.4. Criterion for kill of aircraft 
After determining the existent state of each vulner-
able component, the existent state of the aircraft can be 
determined by kill tree[1]. The kill tree is a visual illus-
tration of the critical components and all component 
redundancies. The kill tree illustrates the number of 
redundant components in a redundant set that must be 
killed to cause an aircraft kill. Kill tree can be ex-
pressed in other forms such as the cut set in reliability 
analysis. 
2.5. Calculating vulnerability using Monte Carlo simu- 
lation 
As shown in Fig.1, Prn denotes the number of air-
craft being killed after z hits during N0 times of Monte 
Carlo simulations. When N0 is large enough, the air-
craft cumulated probability of kill after z hits Pr[z] can 
be approximately determined by 
Pr[z] | Prn/N0                (2) 
3. Examples 
For the sake of making comparisons, assume there 
are seven aircraft (Aircraft 1-7) and they have the 
same 20 critical components as shown in Fig.4. The 
presented area of each aircraft for the given hit aspect 
(bottom threat) is 34.442 501 m2. The kill tree for each 
aircraft is different from each other, implying that the 
seven aircraft have different redundant component 
sets. 
Fig.4 shows the 20 critical components of these air-
craft. Each component is simplified as cuboid for il-
lustration purpose. The component with complex 
geometric configuration can be approximated by flat 
quadrilateral patches as being described in Section 2.1.  
The component code, the cuboid coordinates of the 
left-forward vertex, the component length, width and 
height, and the component probability of kill under a 
given hit pk/h,0 are listed in Table 1. It should be noted 
that, when a component is masked or shielded by other 
components, the mass or velocity of threat will be re-
duced and will result in a reduced pk/h,0. In this exam-
ple, assume that the shot line penetrates all compo-
nents and when masking or shielding happens the 
component probability of kill under a given hit pk/h is 
expressed as 
 k/h k/h,0 80% np p u           (3) 
where n is the number of masking or shielding com-
ponents. Eq.(3) implies that when a component is 
shielded by another component, its pk/h will reduce 
20% and when shielded by two components, its pk/h 
will become the form of pk/h= pk/h,0×(80%)2. Actually, 
this assumption is not necessary, and it is just for con-
venience of making illustration. In the real vulnerabil-
ity assessment, the penetration equation (such as 
JTCG/ME penetration equation[15]) should be used to 
calculate the shot line state of motion, and thus ob-
taining the corresponding pk/h for each component.
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Fig.4  Twenty components of example aircraft. 
 
Table 1  Component information 
Code Coordinates (x, y, z) of the left-forward vertex/m (Length, Width, Height)/m Pk/h,0 
a1 (–1.275 590, –0.001 185, –0.133 333) (0.735 002, 0.400 000, 0.266 666) 0.1 
a2 (–1.469 860,  0.333 864, –0.145 000) (0.750 000, 0.300 000, 0.300 000) 0.1 
a3 (–2.369 860,  0.333 864, –0.145 000) (0.300 000, 0.300 000, 0.300 000) 0.8 
a4 (–3.104 100,  0.553 529, –0.396 942) (0.500 000, 0.450 000, 0.793 884) 0.6 
a5 (–2.823 410, –0.066 500, –0.148 970) (0.400 000, 0.350 000, 0.300 000) 0.5 
a6 (–3.523 410, –0.066 500, –0.148 970) (0.400 000, 0.350 000, 0.297 991) 0.5 
a7 (–3.762 600,  0.784 206, –0.198 532) (0.400 000, 0.800 000, 0.400 000) 0.8 
a8 (–4.265 100,  0.582 060, –0.215 984) (0.454 913, 0.692 154, 0.447 294) 0.3 
a9 (–4.954 590,  0.516 120, –0.404 585) (1.200 000, 0.500 000, 0.809 170) 0.9 
a10 (–6.376 270,  0.580 167, –0.312 736) (0.730 000, 0.600 000, 0.625 472) 0.8 
a11 (–6.376 270, –0.224 800, –0.281 116) (0.730 000, 0.160 000, 0.562 232) 0.8 
a12 (–7.656 560,  0.376 628, –0.261 631) (0.539 829, 0.200 000, 0.917 322) 0.4 
a13 (–7.696 270,  0.527 877, –0.372 376) (0.650 000, 0.300 000, 0.744 752) 0.8 
a14 (–8.456 270,  0.527 853, –0.372 213) (0.600 000, 0.300 000, 0.744 426) 0.8 
a15 (–7.428 200,  0.170 444, –0.200 000) (1.500 000, 0.540 000, 0.421 697) 0.9 
a16 (–9.446 270,  0.510 877,  0.072 376) (1.000 030, 0.783 000, 0.300 000) 0.9 
a17 (–9.446 270,  0.510 877, –0.372 376) (1.000 030, 0.783 000, 0.300 000) 0.9 
a18 (–10.70 000,  0.307 475, –0.299 343) (1.500 000, 0.400 000, 0.973 826) 0.2 
a19 (–6.863 060,  0.038 347,  0.653 394) (1.485 251, 0.200 000, 1.299 996) 0.6 
a20 (–6.863 060,  0.038 347, –1.953 390) (1.485 251, 0.200 000, 1.299 996) 0.6 
 
Table 2 gives the information of redundant compo-
nents for each aircraft. In the fourth column of Table 2, 
the redundant component sets are listed. Each set can 
be expressed as 
Redundant component set = {P1, P2, P3, P4}   (4) 
where P1 denotes the ID of the redundant component 
set, P2 the number of components constituting the set 
of redundant group, P3 the number of items in the re-
dundant set which must be defeated to result in aircraft 
kill, and P4 the code of each redundant component. It 
should be mentioned that, if a component is not listed 
in the column of redundant component sets, it implies 
that the component is nonredundant component.  
Just as aircraft designated as 3 for example, the re-
dundant component sets are {1, 2, 2, a1, a2}, {2, 3, 3, 
a3, a4, a5} and {3, 4, 2, a6, a7, a8, a9}. It means, the 
first set of redundant group has two components, a1 
and a2, killing these two components will lead to air-
craft kill. The second set of redundant group has 3 
components, a3, a4 and a5, killing these 3 components 
will lead to aircraft kill. The third set of redundant 
group has 4 components, a6, a7, a8 and a9, killing any 
two of these four components will lead to aircraft kill. 
Besides, the aircraft has 11 nonredundant components 
and the codes of them are a10, a11," , a20. 
The cumulated probabilities of kill after 1-10 hits 
for the seven aircraft using the proposed one-step di-
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rect simulation method (DSM), “Monte Carlo with 
model of filling boxes with balls” method (two-step 
Monte Carlo method, TS-MC), Markov chain method 
(M-C), simplified approach (binomial) (SA-B), and 
simplified approach (Poisson) (SA-P) are listed in Ta-
ble 3. In Table 3 pK/H (N) represents the aircraft cumu-
lated probability of kill after N hits. The computation 
is conducted with a Pentium 4.0/2.0 GHz personal 
computer. The grid cell length and height (Fig.2) are 
both chosen as 5.0 cm. 
From Table 3, we can see the following results: 
(1) From the standpoint of computation accuracy, 
compared with the exact solving method (Markov 
chain), the proposed direct simulation method can pro-
vide good accuracy. When N0 = 104, the average rela-
tive error is within 5%, and within 1% when N0 = 106. 
However, the accuracy is very poor for using the sim-
plified approach (binomial or Poisson). For example, 
the relative errors are respectively around 10% and 
40% for Aircraft 6 and Aircraft 7. Hence, the simpli-
fied approach (binomial or Poisson) should be used 
cautiously. 
(2) From the standpoint of time cost, as for exact 
solving method (Markov chain), the combinatorial 
explosion will happen and time cost becomes unac-
ceptably long when the total number of redundant 
components reaches a certain amount, since the di-
mensions of Markov transition matrix or the number of 
existent states of aircraft increases exponentially with 
the increase of the number of redundant components. 
In this example, when the number of redundant com-
ponents reaches 20, the time cost is about 10 927 s. 
The computation speed using the simplified approach 
(binomial or Poisson) is very fast, and the CPU run 
time is about 20 s. The computation speed using 
“Monte Carlo with model of filling boxes with balls” 
method is similar to that of the proposed simulation 
method. In general, the computation speed of “Monte 
Carlo with model of filling boxes with balls” method is 
faster than that of the proposed simulation method, but 
is not obvious. 
Table 2 Seven aircraft information 
Aircraft 
designator 
Redundant 
set number 
Redundant 
component 
number 
Redundant component sets 
1 0 0 —— 
2 2 5 {1, 2, 2, a1, a2}, {2, 3, 3, a3, a4, a5} 
3 3 9 {1, 2, 2, a1, a2}, {2, 3, 3, a3, a4, a5}, {3, 4, 2, a6, a7, a8, a9} 
4 4 12 {1, 2, 2, a1, a2}, {2, 3, 3, a3, a4, a5}, {3, 4, 2, a6, a7, a8, a9}, {4, 3, 3, a10, a11, a12} 
5 5 15 {1, 2, 2, a1, a2}, {2, 3, 3, a3, a4, a5}, {3, 4, 2, a6, a7, a8, a9}, {4, 3, 3, a10, a11, a12}, {5, 3, 2, a13, a14, a15} 
6 6 17 {1, 2, 2, a1, a2}, {2, 3, 3, a3, a4, a5}, {3, 4, 2, a6, a7, a8, a9}, {4, 3, 3, a10, a11, a12}, {5, 3, 2, a13, a14, a15}, {6, 2, 2, a16, a17} 
7 7 20 {1, 2, 2, a1, a2}, {2, 3, 3, a3, a4, a5}, {3, 4, 2, a6, a7, a8, a9}, {4, 3, 3, a10, a11, a12}, {5, 3, 2, a13, a14, a15}, {6, 2, 2, a16, a17}, {7, 3, 2, a18, a19, a20} 
Table 3 Computation results 
pK/H (N) 
TS-MC DSM Aircraft designator 
 
M-C 
N0 = 104 N0 = 105 N0 = 106 
SA-B SA-P 
N0 = 104 N0 = 105 N0 = 106 
 N = 1 0.174 702 0.176 000 0.172 810 0.175 237 0.176 524 0.174 941 0.174 800 0.175 750 0.174 714
 N = 2 0.318 884 0.324 200 0.318 750 0.319 228 0.321 888 0.319 277 0.323 000 0.322 120 0.320 144
 N = 3 0.437 876 0.438 300 0.438 470 0.437 356 0.441 591 0.438 363 0.442 000 0.440 700 0.438 931
 N = 4 0.536 080 0.535 700 0.537 840 0.535 969 0.540 164 0.536 616 0.550 800 0.537 460 0.537 410
 N = 5 0.617 128 0.611 400 0.617 710 0.617 431 0.621 336 0.617 681 0.611 400 0.620 970 0.619 143
 N = 6 0.684 017 0.683 100 0.683 130 0.683 568 0.688 179 0.684 564 0.683 900 0.684 210 0.685 639
1 N = 7 0.739 220 0.741 700 0.737 730 0.739 786 0.743 223 0.739 747 0.739 200 0.740 700 0.740 238
 N = 8 0.784 779 0.793 700 0.784 240 0.785 484 0.788 550 0.785 276 0.788 000 0.784 540 0.785 587
 N = 9 0.822 378 0.829 700 0.822 870 0.822 811 0.825 876 0.822 840 0.822 600 0.821 670 0.823 394
  N = 10 0.853 409 0.852 400 0.852 180 0.853 115 0.856 613 0.853 832 0.852 100 0.855 520 0.853 705
 
Average 
relative 
error/% 
0 0.612 081 0.228 704 0.092 196 0.670 845 0.088 129 0.657 333 0.373 193 0.185 368
 Time 
cost/s 
22 22 22 29 22 22 22 28 82 
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Continued 
pK/H (N) 
TS-MC DSM Aircraft designator 
 
M-C 
N0 = 104 N0 = 105 N0 = 106 
SA-B SA-P 
N0 = 104 N0 = 105 N0 = 106 
 N = 1 0.163 395 0.171 200 0.164 020 0.163 320 0.166 726 0.165 146 0.159 700 0.164 200 0.164 308
 N = 2 0.300 093 0.297 200 0.302 610 0.299 526 0.305 654 0.303 019 0.302 800 0.300 050 0.302 009
 N = 3 0.414 457 0.419 200 0.413 660 0.413 876 0.421 421 0.418 124 0.416 200 0.414 110 0.416 212
2 N = 4 0.510 135 0.511 300 0.509 730 0.510 457 0.517 886 0.514 220 0.512 600 0.510 020 0.511 318
 N = 5 0.590 180 0.583 800 0.589 790 0.589 597 0.598 268 0.594 446 0.589 000 0.592 450 0.591 712
 N = 6 0.657 147 0.655 800 0.657 680 0.657 194 0.665 249 0.661 423 0.661 300 0.659 480 0.658 437
 N = 7 0.713 172 0.696 300 0.712 170 0.712 584 0.721 063 0.717 340 0.714 600 0.713 030 0.714 136
 N = 8 0.760 043 0.764 200 0.759 840 0.760 062 0.767 571 0.764 022 0.753 500 0.761 720 0.761 610
 N = 9 0.799 255 0.805 300 0.799 800 0.799 327 0.806 325 0.802 995 0.799 400 0.800 510 0.800 480
  N = 10 0.832 060 0.827 400 0.832 320 0.832 193 0.838 617 0.835 532 0.827 800 0.834 080 0.833 220
 
Average 
relative 
error/% 
0 1.262 865 0.190 678 0.065 402 1.346 426 0.709 890 0.649 035 0.199 326 0.294 249
 Time cost/s 23 21 23 39 23 24 22 28 87 
 N = 1 0.132 241 0.137 300 0.132 230 0.132 332 0.139 516 0.138 167 0.128 600 0.132 200 0.132 640
 N = 2 0.247 324 0.242 600 0.248 540 0.246 977 0.259 837 0.257 510 0.243 400 0.248 590 0.247 946
 N = 3 0.347 413 0.346 000 0.349 010 0.347 780 0.363 553 0.360 545 0.348 900 0.348 300 0.348 066
 N = 4 0.434 413 0.444 100 0.433 480 0.434 457 0.452 915 0.449 460 0.440 600 0.437 040 0.435 575
 N = 5 0.509 996 0.504 600 0.512 790 0.509 999 0.529 877 0.526 159 0.509 000 0.508 800 0.509 655
 N = 6 0.575 627 0.579 200 0.577 970 0.574 757 0.596 133 0.592 292 0.579 600 0.576 950 0.576 744
3 N = 7 0.632 589 0.620 400 0.632 570 0.633 107 0.653 150 0.649 294 0.632 300 0.636 390 0.633 011
 N = 8 0.682 005 0.677 000 0.680 040 0.681 341 0.702 198 0.698 408 0.686 800 0.682 440 0.683 041
 N = 9 0.724 856 0.728 200 0.723 840 0.724 668 0.744 376 0.740 710 0.723 800 0.725 220 0.725 811
  N = 10 0.762 001 0.771 600 0.763 950 0.761 797 0.780 635 0.777 133 0.762 900 0.764 410 0.762 105
 
Average 
relative 
error/% 
0 1.443 279 0.281 637 0.070 857 3.827 565 3.112 661 0.809 004 0.289 827 0.163 359
 Time cost/s 22 21 25 49 22 22 22 28 92 
 N = 1 0.116 482 0.115 800 0.116 740 0.116 753 0.119 157 0.117 864 0.114 400 0.118 070 0.116 892
 N = 2 0.219 773 0.222 000 0.221 210 0.219 194 0.224 399 0.222 116 0.218 300 0.220 810 0.220 034
 N = 3 0.311 305 0.308 800 0.310 070 0.311 671 0.317 306 0.314 285 0.314 600 0.312 750 0.312 235
 N = 4 0.392 366 0.395 000 0.390 650 0.392 033 0.399 284 0.395 733 0.390 200 0.390 930 0.393 471
 N = 5 0.464 109 0.464 000 0.464 410 0.463 985 0.471 589 0.467 676 0.463 800 0.466 150 0.464 582
 N = 6 0.527 569 0.521 900 0.528 950 0.527 740 0.535 334 0.531 197 0.526 100 0.531 500 0.528 559
4 N = 7 0.583 673 0.587 000 0.586 180 0.583 312 0.591 511 0.587 259 0.588 700 0.585 800 0.584 938
 N = 8 0.633 247 0.630 500 0.634 200 0.633 784 0.640 998 0.636 720 0.631 600 0.634 140 0.633 001
 N = 9 0.677 030 0.671 600 0.676 760 0.677 353 0.684 576 0.680 340 0.681 000 0.680 180 0.677 528
  N = 10 0.715 680 0.713 900 0.716 500 0.715 908 0.722 938 0.718 796 0.725 600 0.719 680 0.716 689
 
Average 
relative 
error/% 
0 0.622 740 0.277 049 0.098 389 1.587 138 0.761 132 0.750 698 0.537 981 0.181 081
 Time cost/s 28 22 25 59 22 22 22 29 97 
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Continued 
pK/H (N) 
TS-MC DSM Aircraft designator 
 
M-C 
N0 = 104 N0 = 105 N0 = 106 
SA-B SA-P 
N0 = 104 N0 = 105 N0 = 106 
 N = 1 0.096 059 0.093 400 0.096 410 0.096 044 0.084 455 0.083 368 0.101 700 0.094 130 0.095 784
 N = 2 0.183 538 0.179 400 0.181 880 0.183 329 0.162 831 0.160 829 0.179 700 0.184 250 0.183 542
 N = 3 0.263 109 0.268 600 0.263 260 0.263 226 0.235 407 0.232 645 0.263  600 0.265 200 0.263 902
 N = 4 0.335 409 0.328 700 0.335 100 0.335 841 0.302 477 0.299 096 0.335 700 0.335 410 0.335 795
 N = 5 0.401 033 0.413 000 0.404 980 0.400 415 0.364 342 0.360 466 0.403 500 0.400 140 0.400 921
 N = 6 0.460 538 0.465 300 0.459 550 0.460 629 0.421 306 0.417 047 0.456 600 0.461 930 0.460 909
5 N = 7 0.514 443 0.520 200 0.515 030 0.514 248 0.473 672 0.469 127 0.518 800 0.515 140 0.514 739
 N = 8 0.563 232 0.566 000 0.562 010 0.562 879 0.521 738 0.516 992 0.557 800 0.564 180 0.562 848
 N = 9 0.607 352 0.617 800 0.607 100 0.606 351 0.565 793 0.560 921 0.608 800 0.609 070 0.608 344
  N = 10 0.647 216 0.635 800 0.646 570 0.647 387 0.606 117 0.601 184 0.644 900 0.647 450 0.647 534
 
Average 
relative 
error/% 
0 1.82 2256 0.308 939 0.076 843 0.096 044 9.932 434 1.211 480 0.433 885 0.115 162
 Time 
cost/s 
110 21 27 71 22 22 22 29 102 
 N = 1 0.080 381 0.079 000 0.080 730 0.080 509 0.069 987 0.068 941 0.083 300 0.080 540 0.080 083
 N = 2 0.155 070 0.152 200 0.153 780 0.154 952 0.136 268 0.134 308 0.154 000 0.154 600 0.154 611
 N = 3 0.224 373 0.223 200 0.224 640 0.225 057 0.198 873 0.196 125 0.227 700 0.225 850 0.224 435
 N = 4 0.288 591 0.285 000 0.289 200 0.288 205 0.257 862 0.254 443 0.283 800 0.286 920 0.288 604
 N = 5 0.348 021 0.348 200 0.349 110 0.347 702 0.313 318 0.309 336 0.345 300 0.347 310 0.347 803
 N = 6 0.402 954 0.399 400 0.405 550 0.401 953 0.365 343 0.360 898 0.400 200 0.405 260 0.403 012
6 N = 7 0.453 670 0.447 400 0.451 510 0.453 911 0.414 054 0.409 236 0.452 400 0.455 670 0.453 803
 N = 8 0.500 441 0.496 900 0.499 980 0.499 291 0.459 578 0.454 470 0.500 500 0.499 070 0.500 532
 N = 9 0.543 529 0.534 000 0.542 760 0.543 370 0.502 052 0.496 727 0.539 000 0.542 740 0.544 608
  N = 10 0.583 183 0.586 900 0.581 310 0.583 544 0.541 615 0.536 140 0.584 600 0.581 580 0.583 375
 
Average 
relative 
error/% 
0 1.074 956 0.358 413 0.138 810 9.803 062 10.925 386 1.029 767 0.364 962 0.105 484
 Time 
cost/s 
742 22 27 79 23 22 22 30 107 
 N = 1 0.009 654 0.009 000 0.009 420 0.009 681 0.002 113 0.002 063 0.009 800 0.009 850 0.009 799
 N = 2 0.022 805 0.023 900 0.023 020 0.022 700 0.008 180 0.007 992 0.024 300 0.022 940 0.022 584
 N = 3 0.039 005 0.041 100 0.038 430 0.038 953 0.017 804 0.017 403 0.038 700 0.038 080 0.038 813
 N = 4 0.057 835 0.056 600 0.058 660 0.057 165 0.030 595 0.029 922 0.056 900 0.058 280 0.058 287
 N = 5 0.078 908 0.072 400 0.079 010 0.078 507 0.046 184 0.045 192 0.076 100 0.078 960 0.079 216
 N = 6 0.101 864 0.103 100 0.101 250 0.101 680 0.064 217 0.062 871 0.104 200 0.102 680 0.102 186
7 N = 7 0.126 373 0.132 500 0.126 440 0.126 403 0.084 359 0.082 635 0.127 200 0.126 180 0.126 563
 N = 8 0.1521 323 0.151 100 0.151 780 0.152 338 0.106 297 0.104 179 0.154 600 0.154 380 0.152 763
 N = 9 0.1788 666 0.178 900 0.179 730 0.179 154 0.129 737 0.127 220 0.179 000 0.178 170 0.179 386
  N = 10 0.2063 264 0.206 900 0.205 510 0.206 668 0.154 408 0.151 493 0.211 400 0.206 770 0.206 925
 
Average 
relative 
error/% 
0 3.436 701 0.816 231 0.324 764 43.812 247 44.981 165 2.112 845 0.886 474 0.563 894
 Time 
cost/s 
10 927 22 31 112 23 24 22 30 118 
4. Conclusions 
(1) For Markov chain, tree diagram or “Monte Carlo 
with model of filling boxes with balls” method, when 
component overlapping happens, the aircraft unique 
existent states must be analyzed first by vulnerable 
area decomposition method. The proposed direct 
simulation method can directly calculate the multiple- 
hit vulnerability of aircraft with overlapping compo-
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nents and the complex vulnerable area decomposition 
is avoided. 
(2) Compared with Markov chain method, the pro-
posed direct simulation method can provide good ac-
curacy by increasing the number of times of simula-
tion.  
(3) The computation speed of “Monte Carlo with 
model of filling boxes with balls” method is faster than 
that of the proposed simulation method, but is not ob-
vious. 
(4) The computation speed of the simplified ap-
proach (binomial or Poisson) is very fast, but it should 
be used cautiously because of its poor accuracy. 
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